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Abstract
Authoritarian leaders often claim that they promote democratic institutions such as elections and democratic values. In
China, the central propaganda often promotes the right and duty of citizens to vote in local elections as well as the im-
portance of citizens’ input into the policy making process. However, there is often a gap between government rhetoric
and reality. In this article, we use the China General Social Survey (CGSS) 2013 to evaluate the determinants of voting in
local elections and democratic values (attitudes) in rural and urban China. The results show that respondents with higher
education tend to have lower levels of democratic values and participate less in local elections, but respondents with only
compulsory education are more likely to display democratic orientations and vote. This suggests the relative success as
well as the limits of authoritarian democratic propaganda.
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1. Introduction
In 2012, during the 18th Party Congress, the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) announced the “12 Core Socialist Val-
ues”, and “democracy”was near the top of the list behind
“prosperity”. The list also includes “freedom”, “equality”
and “justice”. Interestingly, these are also some of the
key terms used to describe democratic values in other
countries in North America and Western Europe. In ad-
dition, the CCP also promotes elections especially vot-
ing for grassroots leaders in rural and urban China. How-
ever, the CCP defines democratic values, such as public
participation in government and voting, as a duty rather
than a right. Thus, the term “democracy” may have a
different meaning for citizens in China than in the west-
ern democracies.
In general, much of the previous literature suggests
that democratic values, such as the importance of voting
and having a voice in the policy making process, tend to
develop among the more educated urban middle class
(Boix & Stokes, 2003; Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966). How-
ever, national surveys for the last two decades show that
over 70% of respondents (rural and urban) support the
central leadership (Dickson, 2016). Despite rapid urban-
ization and increased levels of education, general sup-
port among the middle class for the CCP and the sin-
gle party regime remain relatively strong (Chen, 2013;
Chen & Dickson, 2008; Chen & Lu, 2011; Tsai, 2007). At
the same time, rural and urban residents are voting in
competitive grassroots elections (Li, 2003; O’Brien & Li,
2000; Tang, 2016). Thus, do more educated middle class
urban residents hold stronger democratic values? What
is the relationship between democratic values and voting
in China?
One interesting puzzle is that even though there is
wide spread support for the authoritarian regime most
citizens tend to vote in grassroots elections and display a
relatively high level of democratic values. Indeed, previ-
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ous studies and surveys show that most Chinese respon-
dents agree that political participation and individuals
having a voice in the policy making process is an impor-
tant part of the democratic process (Chen& Zhong, 2002;
Shi, 1999). One critical debate is how these democratic
values influence voting within an authoritarian regime.
For example, Shi (1999) suggests that having democratic
values promotes political efficacy and increases the like-
lihood of voting in grassroots elections because they be-
lieve even limited democratic institutions can replace
corrupt local officials. However, Chen and Zhong (2002)
argue that within an authoritarian regime people with
more democratic orientations believe local elections are
ineffective in replacing corrupt cadres and decide to ab-
stain as a form of protest. Yet, both Shi (1999) and Chen
and Zhong (2002) imply causality regarding the influ-
ence of democratic values on voting. Indeed, while there
seems to be a correlation between voting and demo-
cratic values, the direction of causality is unclear. More
importantly, they presuppose a positive relationship be-
tween education and democratic values. However, pre-
vious studies on China’s grassroots elections have yet to
disentangle the effect of education on democratic val-
ues and voting respectively. Moreover, there needs to
be greater emphasis on the definition of democracy in
the Chinese context.
In this article, we examine the possible relationship
between voting in grassroots elections, democratic ori-
entations, and education within an authoritarian regime.
Previous studies examine democratic orientation and
how this may influence voting either by promoting par-
ticipation or abstention. In these studies, voting is the
dependent variable and democratic values are the key
independent variables. However, we argue that it is also
important to look at how voting and education can in-
fluence democratic orientation. Using the 2013 China
General Social Survey (CGSS), we find that education has
strong influence on both voting behavior and democratic
values. Moreover, it is not just the level of education,
but the type of education (compulsory versus secondary)
that affect voting and values. The results show that re-
spondents with no education and those with college de-
grees tend to have the lowest voter turnout rates, sug-
gesting a curvilinear relationship between voting and ed-
ucation. Yet, college educated respondents display the
lowest proportion of democratic values. Thus, higher
education is associated with lower voter participation
as well as lower democratic orientations for both ru-
ral and urban residents. One implication is that respon-
dents with compulsory education (9th grade) or below
aremore likely to absorb state messaging regarding their
duty to vote and accept the CCP definitions of democ-
racy. On the other hand, higher educated respondents
have a more diluted view of their civic duty to vote and
are less acceptant of the CCP presentation of democratic
duties (values).
This article is divided into four sections. For the first
part, we examine the general literature on grassroots
governing bodies in China as well as the relationship
between voting, democratic values, and education. We
also examine one of the key debates regarding the rela-
tionship between democratic values and voting behav-
ior. The second section covers the theoretical assump-
tions and three key hypotheses. The first hypothesis ex-
amines voting as the dependent variable and democratic
values and education as the main independent variables.
The second hypothesis analyzes democratic values as
the dependent variable, with voting and education as
the main independent variables. The third hypothesis in-
cludes CCPmembership as the independent variable and
voting as the dependent variable in order to isolate the
effect of education on voting. The third section is the
descriptive and statistical analysis. We present two sets
of regression models: one with voting as the dependent
variable and the otherwith democratic orientation as the
dependent variable. We find the level of education is a
key explanatory factor regarding a respondent’s willing-
ness to perform their democratic duty (voting) and ac-
ceptance of the CCP democratic values. The fourth and
final section is the concluding comments.
2. Literature Review
Democratic values under the CCP definition reflects citi-
zens’ collective duty to vote, as opposed to the western
definition of liberal democracy that emphasizes individ-
ual rights and freedom. As Shi (1999) argues that the CCP
promotes the idea that voting is citizens’ duty, democ-
racy in China indicates “duty” rather than “rights”. Tang
(2016) also identifies the unique conception of democ-
racywithin China and the need to separate liberal democ-
racy from Chinese definition of democracy. Indeed, Dick-
son (2016) demonstrates that both political leaders and
ordinary citizens in China perceive democracy as citizens’
contributions to the state through political participation
rather than citizens’ individual rights and freedom. Perry
(2008) argues that the increase of protests in China is a
sign of “rules consciousness” and not “rights conscious-
ness” (p. 47) and states that “political rights in modern
China were consistently regarded as bound up with a
moral responsibility to the larger political community”
(p. 46). Therefore, democratic values in the Chinese con-
text reflects a sense of duty to participate (including vot-
ing), rather than pursuits of individual rights.
The CCP promotes this conception of democracy
through propaganda posters and state media. Through
media, the CCP fosters a sense of duty to vote in lo-
cal elections and also advocates the importance of in-
direct elections at the municipal, provincial and central
levels. Beijing’s Election Committee posts posters across
the city that encourage people to vote in district people’s
congress elections. The posters connect vote to democ-
racy as well as party leadership and rule abiding behav-
iors. For instance, one poster says “Cherish democratic
rights. Cast a sacred and solemn vote”. Other posters
include wordings such as “Exercise electoral rights in
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accordance with law” and “Uphold a party leadership.
Uphold and carry forward democracy”. While the party-
state uses words such as rights and democracy, they ef-
fectively connect democratic rights to a sense of duty and
support for the current party leadership. Furthermore,
the word “democracy” frequently appears on state me-
dia’s news articles. For instance, a search for a word
“democracy” in Chinese (“民主”) on the People’s Daily
(“人民网”) web page produces over 240,000 articles. In-
deed, scholars argue that education and state media in-
doctrinate people with the CCP definition of democracy
(Lu, Aldrich, & Shi, 2014; Lu & Shi, 2015).
Western notions of democratic values are strongly
associated with voting and education. Scholars suggest
higher levels of education are associated with demo-
cratic values and in turn these values promote political
participation (Cho, 2015; Evans & Rose, 2012; McAllis-
ter &White, 2017).McAllister andWhite (2017) examine
theWorld Values Survey (WVS) from1990–2012 and find
that education has the strongest influence on a support
for democracy. In China, scholars find similar patterns re-
garding education and democratic values. For instance,
Chen and Zhong (1998) use a 1995 urban Beijing survey
and show that higher levels of education are positively
associated with greater democratic values. Zhong (2005)
conducted a 2000 survey in rural Jiangsu, an economi-
cally developed yet rural area, and finds that along with
other factors a higher level of education positively influ-
ences democratic values. Similarly, Lu (2004) finds the
same results using the 2001 WVS in China.
Rural and urban grassroots elections represent the
CCP attempt to promote party-state vision of partici-
pation and democracy. In the countryside, the lowest
level of administration is the town, and within each
town there are a number of village committees VCs (ru-
ral grassroots units). VC members are responsible for
key village resources, such as collective land, and they
also have a level of autonomy from the town govern-
ment regarding local governance and policy implemen-
tation (Benewick, Tong, & Howell, 2004; Gui, Cheng, &
Ma, 2006; Kennedy, 2002). In urban areas, the lowest
administrative level is the street office and under each
street office are several resident committees (RCs). How-
ever, RCs tend to have less autonomy and manage fewer
resources than their rural counterparts (Heberer, 2008;
Huang, 2008; Read, 2000). As a result, several scholars
suggest that voter turnout tends to be lower for RC elec-
tions than for VCs (Chen & Yao, 2005; Gui et al., 2006).
Several factors may influence voting behavior in ru-
ral and urban grassroots elections. Older residents tend
to vote more than younger professionals even in the ur-
ban grassroots elections (Xiong, 2008). While education
seems to have a positive influence on voting in west-
ern democracies, several studies find that education is
negatively correlated with voting in China. Zheng and
Zhu (2013) use the CGSS for 2006 and they find the
high school and college educated rural and urban respon-
dents are less likely to vote. Read (2003) finds the rel-
atively new class of urban homeowners are more likely
to participate in local elections. These residents have a
greater stake in the RC elections regarding the need for
services such as trash collections and upkeep of pub-
lic spaces.
Although voting in grassroots elections is common in
China, it is unclear how democratic values influence vot-
ing behavior. The debate is whether democratic orienta-
tion promotes participation or abstention in grassroots
elections. Shi (1999) suggests that citizens’ democratic
orientations have a positive influence on voting in China.
In a 1991 nationwide survey, Shi (1999) examines citi-
zens’ voting behaviors in rural and urban grassroots elec-
tions as well as the elections for deputies to local peo-
ple’s congress at both township and county levels. The
election quality for the grassroots and people’s congress
vary by level of competitiveness. A semi-competitive
election has multiple candidates for each seat whereas
non-competitive typically have one candidate for each
available position. Shi (1999) demonstrates thatmore ed-
ucated citizens with greater democratic orientations are
more likely to participate in semi-competitive elections,
but they tend to abstain from non-competitive elections.
Furthermore, the perception that semi-competitive elec-
tions can replace corrupt local leaders increases inter-
nal efficacy and this is associated with a higher voter
turnout. Therefore, Shi (1999) concludes that higher ed-
ucated people hold democratic values and they vote in
local elections to articulate their interests in replacing lo-
cal officials and fostering democracy.
However, some scholars argue that educated citi-
zens who hold democratic values within an authoritarian
regime are more likely to abstain from voting. For exam-
ple, Zhong and Chen (2002) conducted a survey in rural
Jiangsu province in 2000, and find that people who have
democratic orientations, internal efficacy, and a higher
level of education are less likely to vote in the village com-
mittee elections. In addition, Zheng and Zhu (2013) use
the 2006 CGSS to examine factors that influence voter be-
havior in rural and urban grassroots elections, and they
find that democratic values have no significant influence
on voting. Chen and Zhong (2002) evaluate a 1995 sur-
vey conducted in urban Beijing and illustrate that respon-
dents with democratic orientations and internal efficacy
are less likely to vote, whereas those who support the
authoritarian regime are more likely to vote. These citi-
zens abstain from voting, because the “constraints are in-
compatiblewith their democratic values” (Chen& Zhong,
2002, p. 185). Moreover, people who vote in these elec-
tions also display a level of compliance and support for
the central leadership.
The notion that citizens who only complete compul-
sory education are more likely to support the authori-
tarian system and participate in grassroots elections is
similar to previous studies that examine the relationship
between education and regime support. Geddes and Za-
ller (1989) as well as Key (1961) suggest that the educa-
tional experience, especially compulsory education, can
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have a direct influence on an individual’s political opinion.
However, citizens who complete higher education or col-
lege (post compulsory) learn to evaluate rather than sim-
ply absorb state information and they may even begin to
resist state messages and propaganda. Thus, these edu-
cated individuals may also abstain from voting within the
authoritarian system.
Yet these studies assume a positive relationship be-
tween levels of education and democratic values. The
existing literature adopts the western notion of liberal
democracy that focuses on individual rights and freedom.
As a result, previous studies start with the assumption
that education increases democratic values, and exam-
ine whether this orientation encourages people to vote
or abstain. In this study, we start with the CCP defini-
tion of democracy and test the notion of duties rather
than rights. As Key (1961) suggests, compulsory educa-
tion and party-state propaganda may have a strong in-
fluence on citizens’ perception of democratic values and
strengthen their sense of duty. However, given the CCP
definition of democratic values, it is more likely that
higher educated citizens (post compulsory) and profes-
sionals tend to have a weaker sense of duty. These edu-
cated citizens may choose to not vote, and may display
lower levels of commitment to their democratic duties
(lower democratic values). Indeed, non-voting may not
reflect stronger rights consciousness in a liberal demo-
cratic vein, but rather a formof noncompliancewith their
perceived duties.
3. Hypothesis and Measures
In order to test the difference between rights and du-
ties, we evaluate three hypotheses. The first hypothe-
sis examines an influence of democratic values on vot-
ing. Shi (1999) adopts the western definition of demo-
cratic values and argues that voters with democratic val-
ues are more likely to vote to replace local officials. How-
ever, we start with the CCP definition of “duty to vote”
rather than the western definition of individual rights.
Thus, when democratic values are defined as “duty to
vote”, respondents with higher levels of democratic val-
ues should bemore likely to vote. Therefore, we test (H1)
democratic values hypothesis: respondents with higher
level of democratic values aremore likely to vote in grass-
roots elections.
The second hypothesis investigates the impact of ed-
ucation on voting and democratic values respectively.
The general assumption in the literature is that greater
education is positively associated with voting (Boix &
Stokes, 2003; Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966). Scholars also
suggest that education is positively associated with the
western notion of democratic values (Cho, 2015; Evans &
Rose, 2012;McAllister &White, 2017). Overall education
seems to be the driving force influencing democratic val-
ues (rights consciousness) and voting. Furthermore, the
literature assumes a covariation of education and demo-
cratic values and examines their effect on voting (Chen
& Zhong, 2002; Shi, 1999). However, with democracy de-
fined as duty to vote, theoretically “democratic values
and voting” should correspond, rather than “education
and democratic values”. In other words, we suggest ed-
ucation should have a similar effect on both democratic
values and voting. Thus, we examine two dependent vari-
ables, democratic values and voting, and we test (H2) ed-
ucation hypothesis: education influences democratic val-
ues and voting in the same direction.
The third hypothesis further assesses an influence of
education on voting by considering CCP memberships.
Other studies indicate that compulsory education will
strengthen citizens’ support for the state and conform to
the political views of the regime (Geddes & Zaller, 1989;
Key, 1961). This also suggests that people who attain
higher levels of education may challenge these positive
perceptions of the state. However, starting with the CCP
definition of democratic values as a civic duty, higher ed-
ucation should reduce the effect of indoctrination and
propaganda as well as dilute their sense of duty. Thus,
educated respondents are less likely to vote. Yet, even
among educated, if respondents are CCP members, then
they should have amuch stronger sense of duty to partic-
ipate in local elections. Thus, we test (H3) the CCP mem-
bership hypothesis: educated CCP members are more
likely to vote than educated non-party members.
We use the 2013 CGSS to investigate the hypothe-
ses. The CGSS is a collaborative survey with Renmin Uni-
versity of China, Department of Sociology, and the Sur-
vey Research Center of Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology. Since 2003 the CGSS has conducted sev-
eral nationwide surveys and the 2013 survey has a ran-
dom sample of over 11,000 respondents. This sample
size is much larger than that of the 2011 Asian Barom-
eter Surveys in China (N = 3,473) and the 2012 WVS in
China (N = 2,300). The large sample size is one of the
key advantages of the survey because it reduces the stan-
dard error and enables more precise analysis. For ex-
ample, education variable divides respondents accord-
ing to five levels of educational attainment, and each
of the five categories contain more than 1,000 observa-
tions. Finally, the 2013 CGSS contains a specific set of
questions on democratic values. The survey questions
directly inquire people’s perceptions of democracy and
offer a suitable operationalization of democratic values.
Some previous studies tend to use “demand for democ-
racy” as conceptualization of democratic values, but this
assumes a liberal democracy definition (Chen & Zhong,
2002; Shi, 1999). Instead, the CGSS’s questions examine
perceptions of democratic values such as voting and peo-
ple’s voice in government.
Table 1 of the Annex displays the key variable names
and definitions as well as percentage and frequencies
from the 2013 CGSS. The four key variables are vot-
ing, democratic values, levels of education, and CCP
membership. Voting is reported participation in the
last election. Although the survey age range is from
14 to 94 years old, we only include respondents over
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the age of 20 to ensure a sample of possible voters
over the age of 18 for the last election (grassroots elec-
tion occur every three years). Voting is dependent vari-
able in the first set of regression models and indepen-
dent variable in the second set of regression models.
Democratic values is an index combining the following
three survey questions on democratic values: (1) democ-
racy means the government should be for the people
(“民主就是政府要为民做主”), (2) a country is a democ-
racy only when ordinary people have direct voices and
decision power on important state and local matters
(“只有老百姓对国家和地方的大事都有直接的发言权
或决定权,才算是民主”), (3) a country is a democracy if
ordinary people have rights to vote for their own repre-
sentatives to discuss important state and local matters
(“如果老百姓有权选举自己的代表去讨论国家和地方
的大事, 也算是民主”). The answers to each question
are coded dichotomously as either “agree” or “disagree”
and comprise the democratic values index that ranges
from 3 to 6 (6 is the highest level of democratic values).
Democratic values is independent variable in the first
set of regression models and dependent variable in the
second set of regression models.
Education is self-reported completion of specific
grade levels. The key distinction is the difference be-
tween completion of compulsory education (middle
school or 9 years) and post compulsory education (high
school and college). The number of respondents with
CCP membership accounts for 10% of the entire sample.
This is slightly higher than the 6% national percentage of
CCP members.
The control variables include generation, election
quality, class status, home ownership status, and gen-
der. To test generational influence, we divide the popu-
lation into two groups: those born before and after 1968.
This is a delineation based on respondents who came of
age during the reform era (born after 1968) and those
who came of age before. County level election quality
is also a self-reported measure based on the individual
question whether or not the respondent knows the elec-
tion process. Only about 30% of the respondents could
identify the type of election process. The elections vary
from open nominations and competitive elections to no
elections (i.e. appointed positions). For those who know
the process, 58% reported an open election process. We
then examine the number of respondents who reported
open elections within the county, if at least half reported
an open election then we code it as “open elections”.
We find a clear variation in election quality at the county
level. Class status is a self-reportedmeasure of class rang-
ing from1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). The largest proportion
is the 5th category or themiddle class at 33%. Both home-
ownerships and gender are measured dichotomously.
4. Analysis
The descriptive data suggests no clear relationship be-
tween voting and democratic values. Table 2 of the An-
nex shows that only about 50% of respondents with
the highest level of democratic orientations are likely to
vote.While respondentswhohave democratic values are
more likely to vote than those who do not, about half
of the respondents who display democratic values did
not vote at all. Thus, the data does not easily resolve
the democratic orientation and voter abstention debate
(Chen & Zhong, 2002; Shi, 1999). Indeed, there can be a
number of reasons for not voting, from apathy to busy
schedules, as well as diminished sense of duty.
As Gui et al. (2006), Chen and Yao (2005), and Xiong
(2008) point out, voter turnout is much lower in urban
grassroots elections. There is a 14% difference in the
likelihood to vote between rural and urban respondents.
This is possibly due to the fact that urban RCs have fewer
resources and decision-making power than elected VC
members (Xiong, 2008).
Generational differences, election quality and home-
ownership have an influence on voting, while gender and
class have little impact. The majority, just over 60%, of
younger respondents (under 45) did not vote, but thema-
jority of the older respondents voted. This pattern holds
for both rural and urban grassroots elections. Indeed,
as Xiong (2008) suggests the vast majority (64%) of the
older urban respondents voted in the last election as op-
posed to 36% of the younger generation. Election quality
can also influence voter behavior especially within an au-
thoritarian regime. In fact, the majority of respondents
(58%) did not vote in the closed non-competitive elec-
tions, while close to 60% of the respondents that experi-
enced an open election process participated in the elec-
tion. The descriptive data also shows that homeowner-
ship has a positive influence on voting in local elections.
As Read (2003) suggests, homeowners are more politi-
cally active than renters and tend to be involved in grass-
roots elections especially in the urban areas.
Gender and class status have little effect on voting
behavior. The proportion of lower and higher classes
are just as likely to vote (or not vote) as the middle
class. Unlike themiddle class expectations within the tra-
ditional modernization literature, such as Lipset (1959)
and Moore (1966), voting behavior of middle class re-
spondents are no different than other classes. Gender
also has little influence on voting. However, females are
slightly less likely to vote than male respondents.
One of themost striking determinates on voting is ed-
ucation. Table 3 of the Annex displays the non-linear pat-
tern of influence. The smallest proportion of voters are
among respondents with the lowest and highest levels
of education. Indeed, only 33% of college educated re-
spondents voted in the last election. However, majority
of respondents, who attended or only completed com-
pulsory education, voted in the last grassroots election.
It is the middle educated rather than the middle class
who have a higher proportion of political participation.
This reflects Zheng and Zhu (2013) as well as Li’s (2016)
findings regarding the non-linear effect of education on
voting. Table 4 of the Annex shows the similar non-linear
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 90–102 94
relationship between education and voting among CCP
members. However, compared to the entire sample, CCP
members tend to have higher educational attainment.
About 67% of the CCPmembers completed higher educa-
tionwhile only 35%of the total sample completed higher
education. Overall CCP members are far more likely to
vote than non-party members.
The regression analysis suggests a similar pattern ob-
served in the descriptive tables. Table 5 of the Annex dis-
plays four logit regression models with voting in the last
election as dependent variable. This is dichotomous vari-
able and we used a logit model. As the descriptive ta-
bles suggest, Model 1 shows the statistical significance
of democratic values, elections quality, and generation
as well as homeownership, and CCP membership. Gen-
der and class have no influence on voting. The variable
“rural” is 1 for rural and 0 for urban. As the descriptive
statistics suggest, rural respondents are more likely to
vote. Education is not statistically significant in Model 1,
butwhenwe add the squared education term (quadratic)
in Model 2 to test for a non-linear influence we find that
education has a curvilinear influence on voting.
Model 3 only examines rural respondents. Interest-
ingly, the effect of democratic values is not as strong
as urban respondents, but it is still positive and statisti-
cally significant. Thus, a sense of duty (state conception
of democratic values) seems to have a positive associa-
tion with voting. Education remains strong and statisti-
cally significant. Also, males are more likely to vote than
females in rural grassroots elections.
Finally, Model 4 examines urban respondents. In this
model, democratic values are more strongly correlated
with voting than the rural model. Also, CCP membership
is positive and statistically significant in all the four mod-
els. Thus, CCP members are much more likely to vote
than non-partymembers. The data shows that higher ed-
ucated respondents are less likely to vote, but CCP mem-
bers tend to be higher educated. This suggests that the
sense of duty is higher among party members than col-
lage educated nonparty members.
The results support H1 that democratic values pos-
itively influence voting behaviors. The results are in
line with the theoretical assumption that democratic
values, defined as sense of duty, increases the likeli-
hood of voting. The findings appear to support Shi’s
(1999) argument, yet under a different rationale. The
non-linear effect of education remains a strong factor
for all three models, but the magnitude (z-score) of ed-
ucation is lower for urban respondents. In order to test
the influence of education on an individual’s sense of
duty, we need to examine democratic values as depen-
dent variable.
Table 6 of the Annex displays the descriptive rela-
tionship between democratic orientation and education.
First, the overall measure of democratic values is rela-
tively high. For the whole sample, 65% of the respon-
dents display the highest level of democratic values or
a sense of duty to the state. However, with 65% as the
base line, Table 6 shows a clear negative relationship
between education and democratic values with college
educated respondents 18% below the baseline and re-
spondents with no education 13% above. This suggests
that higher levels of education, especially college, erodes
democratic orientation. However, given the definition, it
is more accurate to describe this result as an erosion of
the respondent’s perceived duty to participate in state
functions such as voting.
Table 7 of the Annex shows the ordered logit regres-
sion models with democratic values as the dependent
variable. Like the regression in Table 5, voting is positively
associated with democratic values. However, in this case,
correlation is not causation. Both voting and democratic
values are viewed as a sense of duty and this varies with
the level of education. Model 2 in Table 7 suggests older
rural respondents are more likely to hold democratic ori-
entation. This is also associated with education. Older re-
spondents tend to have lower levels of education espe-
cially in the countryside. Thus, we expect them to display
a high level of duty to the state.
The results support H2 that education influences
democratic values and voting in the same direction. Ta-
ble 7 shows that respondents with the lower levels of
education are more likely to display a sense of duty to
vote and participate in the political system. The results
from the two regression models in Table 5 and Table 7
suggest that education drives both voting and measures
of democratic orientation into the samedirection. Our re-
sults differ from previous research because we start with
a CCP definition of democratic values.
The results from Table 4, Table 5 and Table 7 support
H3 that educated CCP members are more likely to vote
than educated non-party members. Table 4 shows that
CCP members are mostly higher educated, and Table 4
and Table 5 show that they aremore likely to vote. Table 7
shows that CCPmembership and democratic values have
a negative relationship, but not statistically significant.
This indicates that CCP members are more likely to fulfil
their duty to vote even though they are higher educated.
The reason why higher educated respondents are
less likely to vote and have a reduced sense of duty is due
to the education system and indoctrination of the CCP
definition of democracy, especially through compulsory
education. The CCP has historically claimed to be demo-
cratic and promotes the CCP definition of democracy and
political participation including the right to vote and the
role of the people in decision making. Moreover, the
most intensive exposure to government perspective is
compulsory education. Observing American public opin-
ion, V. O. Key (1961) argued that “formal education may
serve to indoctrinate people into the more-or-less offi-
cial political values of the culture” (p. 340). The effective-
ness of this indoctrination may be greater in authoritar-
ian regimes (Geddes & Zaller, 1989; Kennedy, 2009). In-
deed, compulsory education in China instils the ideals of
a socialist democracy that includes the right to vote and
people’s influence in the decision-making process, which
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indoctrinates people to perceive a sense of duty to vote
as democratic values.
Higher education is typically viewed as the opportu-
nity to expand the educational experience and question
the status quo. This is at the heart of the liberal demo-
cratic ideal of higher education and enlighten political
views especially questioning authority. However, higher
education in China does not provide this type of liberal
experience, but the high school and college educational
opportunities do move beyond the compulsory educa-
tion particularly in the areas of career choice and spe-
cialization. Post compulsory education may have the un-
intended consequence of diluting the sense of political
or civic duty that was instilled during elementary and
middle school years. The only way to maintain the CCP
democratic duty after college is to be involved in a ca-
reer choice that includes CCP membership. In fact, many
younger CCP members join when they were in college in
order to improve their employment chances.
5. Conclusion
One of the most challenging aspects of studying au-
thoritarian regimes, especially in China, is the problem
of translation and definitions. The word democracy in
China is minzhu and it literally translates to “People in
Charge”. The “people” are the face of the authoritarian
leadership from the inception of the People’s Republic of
China to the “12 Core Socialist Values” of the 18th Party
Congress.While the central leadership introduced village
elections and political reforms in the 1980s and 1990s,
the intentionwas not to democratize China from a liberal
democracy perspective, but to expand the democratic
duties of the “people”. Most Chinese grow up hearing
the words “democracy”, “freedom” and “elections”, but
these terms do not reflect the individual rights as they
are understood in liberal democracies. Instead, the terms
are part of the party state lexicon including conception of
the “people” and duties as well as service to the state.
When evaluating Chinese attitudes or perceptions of
democracy, researchers need to discuss not only the ac-
cepted social and political definitions, but also how and
where citizens can be exposed to alternative definitions.
Our study started off with the CCP definition of democ-
racy and the concept of duty rather than rights. Given
this definition, the results seem to contradict previous
assumptions regarding the relationship between demo-
cratic values, voting and education.While our study does
not support the ideal that higher education instills liberal
values even in China, a closer look suggests that our re-
sults do support the general idea that higher education
can dilute state propaganda and indoctrination in com-
pulsory education. This may have great implications for
regime support in the future.
The remaining puzzle is that while most surveys still
display relatively strong public support for the central
leadership, a growing number of citizens are completing
high school and college education especially in urban ar-
eas. In addition, China is urbanizing at a rapid pace. In
order to maintain public support, the CCP aggressively
promoted the “12 Core Socialist Values” during the 18th
(2012) and 19th (2017) Party Congress. Thus, is the Core
Socialist Values campaign generating greater trust and
support for the regime or widening the gap between gov-
ernment rhetoric and practice?
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Annex
Table 1. Descriptive data for voting and democratic values. Source: China General Social Survey 2013.
Code Variable Label Percentage Frequency
vote Voted in last VC and RC elections (over 20)
Yes [1] 48% 4,922
No [0] 52% 5,389
demo123 Democratic Values Index
Agree to all three [6] 65% 5,947
Agree to two out of three [5] 25% 2,340
Disagree to two out of three [4] 9% 817
Disagree to all three [3] 1% 114
generation Respondents born before and after 1968
Over 45 [1] 49% 5,650
Under 45 [0] 51% 5,788
edu Level of Education
No Education [1] 13% 1,484
Elementary School [2] 23% 2,582
Middle School [3] 29% 3,326
High School [4] 19% 2,180
College [5] 16% 1,863
coelect Quality of election grassroots election: good quality is open nomination
process and competitive election within the county
Open Elections, Yes [1] 37% 4,099
No [0] 63% 7,123
rural Hukou status at the time of the survey
Rural [1] 55% 6,333
Urban[0] 45 % 5,083
ownhome Respondent owns home
Yes [1] 50% 5,672
No [0] 50% 5,731
class Self-identified class status: Highest 10, Lowest 1
[1] 7% 788
[2] 8% 867
[3] 16% 1,778
[4] 18% 2,074
[5] 33% 3,708
[6] 12% 1,319
[7] 5% 518
[8] 2% 234
[9] 0 35
[10] 1% 74
gender Male [1] 50% 5,756
Female [0] 50% 5,682
party Chinese Communist Party member
Yes [1] 10% 1,161
No [0] 90% 10,277
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Table 2. Voting and democratic values for respondent over 20 years old. Source: China General Social Survey 2013.
Democratic Values
Voting Low Medium Low Medium High High
No 74% 65% 55% 49%
Yes 26% 35% 45% 51%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(freq) (91) (688) (2,042) (5,484)
Table 3. Voting and the level of education for respondents over 20 years old. Source: China General Social Survey 2013.
Education Level
Voting No Education Elementary Middle High College
No 55% 43% 49% 56% 67%
Yes 45% 57% 51% 44% 33%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(freq) (1,425) (2,481) (3,070) (1,833) (1,500)
Table 4. Voting and the level of education for respondents over 20 years old with CCPmemberships. Source: China General
Social Survey 2013.
Education Level
Voting No Education Elementary Middle High College
No 37% 31% 34% 38% 57%
Yes 63% 69% 66% 62% 43%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(freq) (41) (108) (218) (260) (469)
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Table 5. Factors that influence voting in village committee (rural) and residence committee (urban) elections in China (2013)
for respondents over 20 years old.
Coefficient (z-score)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Rural) (Urban)
Democratic Value 0.20 ∗ ∗∗ 0.19 ∗ ∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.24 ∗ ∗∗
(5.58) (5.22) (2.33) (4.97)
Election Quality 0.57 ∗ ∗∗ 0.58 ∗ ∗∗ 0.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.57 ∗ ∗∗
(11.12) (11.33) (7.60) (7.18)
Generation (age) 0.53 ∗ ∗∗ 0.54 ∗ ∗∗ 0.57 ∗ ∗∗ 0.59 ∗ ∗∗
(10.11) (10.29) (8.00) (7.16)
Rural 0.67 ∗ ∗∗ 0.63 ∗ ∗∗
(11.84) (10.95)
Gender 0.06 0.02 0.14∗ −0.16∗
(1.18) (0.40) (2.06) (2.21)
Education −0.02 0.79 ∗ ∗∗ 1.05 ∗ ∗∗ 0.66 ∗ ∗∗
(0.60) (8.24) (7.28) (3.75)
Education Squared −0.13 ∗ ∗∗ −0.20 ∗ ∗∗ −0.11 ∗ ∗∗
(8.69) (7.31) (4.10)
Class Status 0.002 0.004 −0.002 0.005
(0.11) (0.24) (0.12) (0.23)
Home Ownership 0.46 ∗ ∗∗ 0.44 ∗ ∗∗ 0.50 ∗ ∗∗ 0.35 ∗ ∗∗
(9.34) (8.80) (7.32) (4.77)
CCP member 0.48 ∗ ∗∗ 0.59 ∗ ∗∗ 1.09 ∗ ∗∗ 0.47 ∗ ∗∗
(6.19) (7.41) (6.48) (4.97)
North China 0.30 ∗ ∗ 0.32 ∗ ∗∗ 0.40 ∗ ∗ 0.14
(3.43) (3.64) (3.11) (1.17)
Northeast China −0.15 −0.18∗ 0.46 ∗ ∗∗ −1.00 ∗ ∗∗
(1.89) (2.23) (4.13) (7.52)
East China 0.14∗ 0.16∗ 0.18∗ 0.03
(2.03) (2.30) (2.03) (0.32)
Southwest China 0.28 ∗ ∗ 0.28 ∗ ∗ 0.29 ∗ ∗ 0.25
(3.48) (3.47) (2.89) (1.84)
Northwest China −0.19 −0.14 0.07 −0.69 ∗ ∗
(1.88) (1.39) (0.60) (3.37)
Constant −2.42 ∗ ∗∗ −3.34 ∗ ∗∗ −2.80 ∗ ∗∗ −3.23 ∗ ∗∗
(10.02) (12.58) (7.52) (7.73)
Notes: For Model 1 and 2 N = 8,073, for Model 3 N = 4,376 and Model 4 N = 3,697. *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05.
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Table 6. Democratic values and the level of education. Source: China General Social Survey 2013.
Education Level
Democratic Values No Education Elementary Middle High College
Low 0% 0% 1% 2% 3%
Medium Low 4% 6% 7% 11% 17%
Medium High 18% 19% 25% 29% 34%
High 78% 75% 67% 58% 47%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(freq) (1,021) (1,976) (2,745) (1,848) (1,625)
Table 7. Factors that influence individual democratic values in China (2013) for respondents over 20 years old.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 (Rural) Model 3 (Urban)
Voting in Local Elections 0.27 ∗ ∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.37 ∗ ∗∗
(5.53) (2.39) (5.30)
Generational Differences 0.31 ∗ ∗∗ 0.44 ∗ ∗∗ 0.17∗
(5.86) (5.79) (2.26)
Education −0.20 ∗ ∗∗ −0.17 ∗ ∗∗ −0.23 ∗ ∗∗
(7.96) (4.59) (6.74)
Gender −0.17 ∗ ∗ −0.13 −0.20 ∗ ∗
(3.48) (1.68) (3.03)
Class Status −0.03 −0.04 −0.02
(1.92) (1.66) (0.94)
Home Ownership 0.06 0.06 0.06
(1.29) (0.82) (0.83)
Rural 0.41 ∗ ∗∗
(7.27)
CCP member −0.07 −0.18 −0.008
(0.88) (1.25) (0.09)
North China −0.01 −0.11 0.09
(0.17) (0.86) (0.92)
Northeast China 0.57 ∗ ∗∗ 0.48 ∗ ∗∗ 0.71 ∗ ∗∗
(6.66) (3.81) (5.98)
East China 0.18 ∗ ∗ 0.09 0.29 ∗ ∗
(2.69) (0.99) (3.02)
Southwest China 0.25 ∗ ∗ 0.15 0.41 ∗ ∗
(2.94) (1.35) (3.04)
Northwest China 0.27 ∗ ∗ 0.33∗ 0.14
(2.60) (2.48) (0.83)
Notes: For Model 1 N = 8,239, for Model 2 N = 4,386 and Model 3 N = 3,853. *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05.
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